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research will increase lay awareness of informed consent problems and
stimulate input into their solution, thus helping to bring scientific and
legal standards together.
States considering informed consent to research legislation should
have a clear idea of the goals they desire and the policies they wish to
promote. Combining New York and California's statutory enforce-
ment mechanisms would undoubtedly increase the effectiveness of in-
formed consent legislation in preventing harm and promoting rational
decisionmaking. That some subject autonomy is sacrificed to the re-
view committee's power to veto dangerous research is a factor to be
considered85 in gauging the relative strength of society's commitment to
scientific progress and to human rights. Legislators in other states are
well advised to follow the example of New York and California and
enact legislation similarly protective of the experimental subject's
rights; finding the best form for such legislation to take, however, is
indeed a challenging task.
NANCY M. P. KING
Criminal Procedure-People v. Wheeler: Peremptory Challenge
May Not Be Used to Remove Jurors Solely for Group
Association
Systematic exclusion of blacks from jury lists, grand juries, and
petit jury venires has long been constitutionally prohibited.' Blacks
have continued to be underrepresented on petit juries, however, largely
because of the prosecutor's use of the peremptory challenge to remove
prospective black jurors in criminal cases in which the defendant is
black.' Fourteen years ago, addressing itself to a charge of
prosecutorial use of the peremptory to exclude blacks, the United
85. The only diminution of autonomy here would of course lie in the loss of the freedom to
decide to volunteer for dangerous research, not the freedom to refuse research participation. Al-
though in principle such a loss may be significant, it is likely that only the most extraordinarily
altruistic people would find it so.
1. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
2. See J. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES 154-56 (1977).
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States Supreme Court declared in Swain v. Alabama3 that the peremp-
tory challenge by its nature precluded any judicial inquiry into its exer-
cise in any one case.' Although the Supreme Court acknowledged that
a prosecutor's systematic use of the peremptory challenge to exclude
blacks from petit juries in case after case might constitute a violation of
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment,' no defend-
ant has met the difficult burden imposed by Swain for proving such a
violation.'
Relieving defendants of the need to demonstrate case-after-case
exclusion, the California Supreme Court recently became the first court
in the nation to subject the exercise of the peremptory in individual
cases to judicial scrutiny. The court held in People v. Wheeler7 that the
use of the peremptory to remove jurors in criminal cases8 solely be-
cause of their membership in a cognizable group9 violates the Califor-
nia constitution's guarantee of a jury drawn from a representative
cross-section of the community.' Although it significantly restricts the
use of a device traditionally considered valuable to both prosecutors
and defendants,I the decision represents a major step toward the selec-
tion of juries that truly represent a cross-section of the community.
In Wheeler two black defendants were convicted of the murder of
a white victim. 2 Although none of the blacks in the venire was chal-
lenged for cause, the prosecutor used his peremptory challenge to strike
3. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
4. Id. at 221-22.
5. Id. at 223-24.
6. See People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 286, 583 P.2d 748, 768, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 909
(1978); Annot., 79 A.L.R.3d 14, 22 (1977). See also notes 50-66 and accompanying text infra.
7. 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978).
8. The court did not decide whether its holding would apply to civil cases. Id. at 282 n.29,
583 P.2d at 765 n.29, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906 n.29.
9. Observing that blacks, the group excluded in Wheeler, clearly constitute a cognizable
group, the court found it unnecessary to discuss what other groups might also be cognizable for
purposes of the representative cross-section rule. Id. at 280 n.26, 583 P.2d at 764 n.26, 148 Cal.
Rptr. at 905 n.26. The United States Supreme Court has held the following to be cognizable
groups that may not systematically be excluded from jury lists, grand juries, or petit jury venires:
racial groups, Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478 (1954); groups defined by ancestry or na-
tional origin, id. at 479; women, Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 531 (1975); daily wage earners,
Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 225 (1946). For thorough discussions of the issue of
what constitutes a cognizable group, see . VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 47-49; Note, Limiting the
Peremptory Challenge:Representation of Groups on Petit Juries, 86 YALE L.J. 1715, 1735-38 (1977).
10. 22 Cal. 3d at 276-77, 538 P.2d at 761-62, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 903.
11. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. at 211-21; Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "1is Wonderful
Power," STAN. L. REv. 545, 546, 552-55 (1975).
12. 22 Cal. 3d at 262, 583 P.2d at 752, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 893.
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each of the seven black veniremen called to the jury box.' 3 Defense
counsel made two unsuccessful motions for mistrial on the ground that
the prosecutor was using his peremptory challenges to prevent the jury
from being composed of a fair cross-section of the community.' 4 The
trial judge offered the prosecutor an opportunity to respond to defense
counsel's charge, but did not require him to do so.t5 Following each
motion, the prosecutor declined to respond, the trial judge denied the
motion for mistrial, and voir dire continued.' 6 Since no more blacks
were called to the box, the jury that ultimately convicted the defendants
was composed solely of whites.' 7
On appeal the California Supreme Court reversed the convic-
tions.' Use of the peremptory challenge to remove jurors solely be-
cause of their membership in "an identifiable group distinguished on
racial, religious, ethnic or similar grounds"' 9 is constitutionally imper-
missible, the court reasoned, because it "frustrates the primary purpose
of the representative cross-section requirement." 0 As the court ob-
served, however, a representative jury may nevertheless include jurors
who hold a bias "concerning the particular case on trial or the parties
or witnesses thereto"-what the court called "specific bias." 2' Because
specific biases are as likely to be held by members of one cognizable
group as by those of another, the removal of specifically biased jurors
via the peremptory challenge will not significantly reduce the represen-
tative character of the jury, and is therefore permissible.2
13. Id. at 263, 583 P.2d at 752, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 893. The record showed that five black
veniremen were peremptorily challenged by the prosecutor. Defense counsel filed a declaration
with the California Supreme Court, however, indicating that before defense counsel began asking
veniremen to state their race for the record, two other blacks were peremptorily challenged by the
prosecution. Id. at 263, 583 P.2d at 752-54, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 894.
14. Id. at 263-65, 583 P.2d at 753-54, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 894-95.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. .1d. at 265, 583 P.2d at 754, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 895.
18. Id. at 280, 583 P.2d at 766, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905.
19. Id. at 276, 583 P.2d at 761, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 902. When bias is presumed because of the
juror's membership in such a group it is defined as "group bias." Id.
20. Id. The court stated that the peremptory challenging of all members of the group frus-
trates the cross-section requirement. Id. Nevertheless, use of the peremptory to remove less than
all of the members of the group from the venire solely because of their group membership is also
unconstitutional. A party can establish a prima facie case of illegal use of the peremptory by
showing, inter alia, "that his opponent has struck most or all of the members of the identified
group from the venire, or has used a disproportionate number of his peremptories against the
group." Id. at 280, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905 (emphasis added).
21. Id. at 276, 583 P.2d at 761, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 902.
22. Id.
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In order to protect the representative character of juries, while re-
specting the legitimate purposes of the peremptory challenge and the
integrity of the attorneys who exercise it, the Wheeler court adopted a
procedure under which a party is required to justify his challenges only
if his opponent can make out a prima facie case of impermissible use of
the peremptory.23 A prima facie case is established by showing a
"strong likelihood" that the allegedly offending party is using his per-
emptory challenges to remove members of a cognizable group solely
because of their association with the group.24 Once a party has made a
prima facie case, the allegedly offending party has the burden of show-
ing that his peremptory challenges were used only to remove jurors
with specific biases.25 Finding that defendants had made a prima facie
case of the prosecutor's impermissible use of the peremptory, and that
the prosecutor had failed to rebut that showing, the court granted de-
fendants a new trial.26
The notion that juries should be drawn from a representative
cross-section of the community first received the endorsement of the
United States Supreme Court in Smith v. Texas.27 Justice Black's opin-
ion for the Court declared: "It is part of the established tradition in the
use of juries as instruments of public justice that the jury be a body
truly representative of the community."28 He did not, however, link
the idea of representativeness to the sixth amendment right to jury trial.
Justice Black instead based the reversal of defendant's conviction on
the more traditional theory that systematic exclusion of blacks from
grand juries and petit jury venires denied black defendants their four-
23. Id. at 280, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905. Until such a prima facie case is estab-
lished, the party is presumed to be exercising his peremptory challenges in a constitutionally per-
missible manner. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 281-82, 583 P.2d at 764-65, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 907.
26. Id. at 283, 583 P.2d at 766, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 907. Chief Justice Bird filed a concurring
opinion in which she agreed that "the state's use of peremptory challenges to remove jurors on the
sole ground of race violates the right to trial by jury drawn from a representative cross-section of
the community under article I, section 16 of the California Constitution." Id. at 287, 583 P.2d at
769, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 910. Apparently referring to the procedure set forth by the majority for
implementing the cross-section requirement, Chief Justice Bird said that she did not concur "in
the dicta in the majority opinion which suggest other restrictions on the use of peremptory chal-
lenges." Id.
In a dissenting opinion in which Justice Clark joined, Justice Richardson attacked the major-
ity's limitation on the exercise of the peremptory challenge as unsupported in theory and unwork-
able in practice. Id. at 288, 583 P.2d at 769, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 910 (dissenting opinion).
27. 311 U.S. 128 (1940); see People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 267, 583 P.2d at 755, 148 Cal.
Rptr. at 896.
28. 311 U.S. at 130.
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teenth amendment right of equal protection of the laws. 29 In three
cases following Smith v. Texas, the Supreme Court continued to assert
the importance of jury representativeness.3 0  These cases, however,
were not decided on any constitutional basis, but rather on the Court's
supervisory power over the administration of justice in the federal
courts.3 1
The representative cross-section requirement moved slightly closer
to constitutional status in Peters v. Kffa2 Justice Marshall's plurality
opinion, in which two other justices joined, claimed that the Court had
already recognized the representative cross-section requirement as an
element of the sixth amendment right to jury trial.33 Indeed, the Court
29. Id. at 130-32; see Daughtrey, Cross Sectionalism in Jury Selection Procedures After Taylor
v. Louisiana, 43 TENN. L. REv. 1, 19 (1975).
The United States Supreme Court first invoked the equal protection clause to prohibit a
state's intentional exclusion of blacks from jury service in Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303
(1880). Recognizing the difficulty of proving intentional discrimination, the Court in Norris v.
Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 598 (1935), developed a rule under which black defendants could make
out a prima facie case of illegal exclusion by showing that, despite the presence of qualified blacks
in the community, no blacks had been called for jury service for a considerable length of time.
Once the defendant had established a prima facie case, the burden shifted to the state to make a
sufficient showing that it had employed nondiscriminatory selection practices-a burden that, the
Court declared, could not be met merely by a jury official's testimony that he had not considered
race in choosing names for the jury roll. Id. In subsequent cases, e.g., Whitus v. Georgia, 385
U.S. 545 (1967), the Court modified the "prima facie rule" or "rule of exclusion" by eliminating
the requirement of total exclusion. Instead, the Court allowed defendants to make out a prima
facie case of illegal discrimination by showing that members of a cognizable group had been
substantially excluded from jury lists and venires, and that the state's jury selection system pro-
vided an opportunity for officials to discriminate against the group. See J. VAN DYK, supra note
2, at 53-62.
30. Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193-95 (1946); Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328
U.S. 217, 220 (1946); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86 (1942).
31. In hiel, 328 U.S. 217, 225 (1946), and Ballard, 329 U.S. 187, 193 (1946), the Court ex-
pressly invoked its supervisory powers to reverse the judgment below. In Glasser, 315 U.S. 60, 87
(1942), the Court rejected defendants' attack on the jury selection system because defendants
failed to make a sufficient showing that, as they alleged, the only women allowed to sit on juries in
the district were members of the League of Women Voters. Nevertheless, the Court implied that
had the allegations been more strongly supported, it would have reversed the convictions for fail-
ure to comport with the representative cross-section requirement. d. at 86. Although the opinion
did not identify the source (the Constitution or supervisory powers) on which it would have relied
had it reversed the convictions, presumably it would have relied on its supervisory powers since
the case was a federal prosecution. See Daughtrey, supra note 29, at 20-23.
In Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947) the Court made it clear that a jury drawn from a
representative cross-section of the community was not at that time guaranteed by the Constitution.
The Court upheld New York's "special jury" system, under which some cases were tried by jurors
drawn from a special panel on which women, laborers, craftsmen and service employees were
grossly underrepresented. Id. at 276-79, 290. The cases requiring representative panels on
venires, the Court said, were distinguishable because they relied on the Court's supervisory pow-
ers over the federal courts. Id. at 287.
32. 407 U.S. 493 (1972).
33. Id. at 500.
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had observed two years earlier in Williams v. Florida3 4 that the size of a
jury should be large enough "to provide a fair possibility for obtaining
a representative cross-section of the community."35 Since the issue in
Williams was not the constitutional basis for the representative cross-
section rule, however, but whether the sixth amendment right to trial
by jury required a jury of twelve, the quoted statement is arguably dic-
tum. Thus, Justice Marshall's statement in Peters that Williams had
already incorporated the cross-section requirement into the sixth
amendment is questionable. Furthermore, Peters itself did not require
consideration of the cross-section rule's relationship to the sixth
amendment because the defendant in Peters was tried prior to the
Court's holding in Duncan v. Louisiana36 that the sixth amendment
right to jury trial was applicable to the states.37
In Taylor v. Louisiana,38 the Supreme Court finally held that the
fair cross-section requirement is a fundamental element of the sixth
amendment right to jury trial.39 Because the right to jury trial had pre-
viously been held to be incorporated by the fourteenth amendment,
40
the Court in Taylor held that the cross-section requirement, too, was
applicable to the states.4 ' The Taylor Court was careful to note, how-
ever, that it was not requiring that the petit jury itself be a fair cross-
section of the community, but that the "wheels, pools of names, panels,
or venires from which juries are drawn must not systematically exclude
34. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
35. Id. at 100.
36. 391 U.S. 145, 147-49 (1968).
37. 407 U.S. at 496.
38. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
39. Id. at 530. Although defendant in Taylor was male, the Court held that he could chal-
lenge the substantial exclusion of women from jury panels in Louisiana. Id. at 526. In so holding,
the Taylor Court followed the reasoning of Justice Marshall's plurality opinion in Peters v. Kiff,
407 U.S. 493 (1972). Prior to Peters, some state courts had held that only those defendants who
were members of the excluded group or class could raise the claim that systematic exclusion of the
group violated the defendant's right to equal protection or due process. Eg, State v. Lea, 228 La.
724, 84 So. 2d 169 (1955); Alexander v. State, 160 Tex. Crim. 460, 274 S.W.2d 81, cert. denied, 348
U.S. 872 (1954); see also Daughtrey, supra note 29 at 14-15, 27 n.107; Note, The Defendant's Chal-
lenge to a Racial Criterion in Jury Selection. A Study in Standing, Due Process and Equal Protec-
tion, 74 YALE L.J. 919, 920 n.12 (1965). Nevertheless, Justice Marshall's plurality opinion in
Peters declared that defendant, who was white, could challenge a jury selection system that ex-
cluded blacks, without having to show actual prejudice. 407 U.S. at 504. The arbitrary exclusion
of any race from jury service denies any defendant due process, Justice Marshall said, because a
jury from which any discernible class has been excluded both gives the appearance of bias and
increases the likelihood of actual bias. Id. at 503-04.
40. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
41. 419 U.S. at 537-38.
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distinctive groups in the community and thereby fail to be reasonably
representative thereof."4 This carefully limited holding implied that
the Court did not intend the cross-section requirement to be extended
to require judicial supervision of the peremptory challenge.43
The right of each litigant, in both civil and criminal cases, to
"challenge" prospective jurors who the litigant thinks are biased
against him is a well-established element of the jury system.44 Chal-
lenges "for cause" may be exercised in unlimited numbers, but to be
successful in removing a juror the challenging party must satisfy the
trial judge that the challenged juror has a bias that falls within one of
several statutorily defined categories.4 5 Generally, the ground for a
challenge for cause is either an "implied" or an "actual" bias.46 The
former is a bias that is implied by the existence of a relationship-such
as kinship, trust, employment, or participation in prior judicial pro-
ceedings involving a party to the present case-between the prospective
juror and a party. Actual bias, a much broader category, is a state of
mind that would prevent a juror from making an impartial decision.47
The peremptory challenges, unlike challenges for cause, have histori-
cally been exercised without any explanation or justification48 and are
limited in number by statute.49
In Swain v. Alabama50 the Supreme Court considered the conflict
between the peremptory challenge and the cases prohibiting systematic
exclusion of blacks from jury service. Defendant Swain, a black man,
alleged that the prosecution had denied him equal protection of the
law5" by peremptorily striking all six blacks in the venire from which
42. Id. at 538.
43. See People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 291, 583 P.2d at 771, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 912 (1978)
(dissenting opinion).
44. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212-17 (1965); see Babcock, Supra note 11, at 549-58.
45. J. VAN DYnKE, supra note 2, at 139-140.
46. People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 273-74, 583 P.2d at 759, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 901 (1978); J.
VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 141-43.
47. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1073 (West 1970) defines actual bias as "the existence of a state of
mind on the part of the juror in reference to the case, or to either of the parties, which will prevent
him from acting with entire impartiality and without prejudice to the substantial rights of either
party."
48. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. at 220.
49. Statutes generally authorize different numbers of peremptories for civil and criminal
cases, and for different types of criminal offenses. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1976); FED. R.
C~aM. P. 24(b); CAL. CwV. PROC. CODE § 601 (West Supp. 1979); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1070,
1070.5 (West Supp. 1979).
50. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
51. At the time Swain was decided the sixth amendment right to jury trial had not yet been
held applicable to the states, as it later was in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). Nor had
the Court held, as it later did in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), that the representative
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his jury was drawn.52 The Court reaffirmed the value of the un-
restricted exercise of the peremptory challenge and observed that "race,
religion, nationality, [and] occupation" were all reasons for which the
peremptory has traditionally and properly been exercised.53 In holding
that a prosecutor's use of the peremptory in a particular case to strike
jurors for racial reasons is not a violation of the equal protection clause,
the Court reasoned that
[t]o subject the prosecutor's challenge in any particular case to the
demands and traditional standards of the Equal Protection Clause
would entail a radical change in the nature and operation of the chal-
lenge. The challenge, pro tanto, would no longer be peremptory,
each and every challenge being open to examination, either at the
time of the challenge or at a hearing afterwards.5
4
While he refused to subject individual peremptory challenges to
constitutional evaluation, Justice White implied in his majority opin-
ion55 that a prosecutor's long-continued, systematic use of the peremp-
tory to exclude blacks from petit juries would constitute a violation of
the fourteenth amendment.56 The opinion imposed a heavy burden of
proof, however, on the defendant who would seek to demonstrate such
discriminatory use of the peremptory. The Court indicated that it
would require a showing of total exclusion,57 "in case after case,
whatever the circumstances, whatever the crime and whoever the de-
fendant or the victim may be," in order to establish a fourteenth
amendment violation.5" Furthermore, the Court stated that merely
cross-section requirement was an essential element of the sixth amendment. Defendant in Swain,
therefore, sought to analogize the prosecutor's discriminatory use of the peremptory to the estab-
lished principle that systematic exclusion of blacks from jury lists, grand juries, and petit jury
venires is a violation of the equal protection clause.
52. 380 U.S. at 209-10. Defendant also unsuccessfully attacked the selection of the grand
jury that indicted him and the petit jury venire from which his jury was drawn as purposefully
racially discriminatory. Id. at 205-09.
53. Id. at 220-22.
54. Id. at 221-22.
55. A majority of the Court joined in all of Justice White's opinion except that part in which
he implied that the prosecutor's long-continued systematic use of the peremptory to exclude
blacks from the petit jury, if proven, would violate the equal protection clause. Justice Harlan,
while concurring in the rest of the Court's opinion, "emphasized [his] understanding" that the
Court did not decide whether such conduct on the part of a prosecutor would be unconstitutional.
Id. at 228 (concurring opinion). Because the three dissenting justices believed that defendant in
Swain had established a prima facie case of denial of equal protection, id. at 231-32 (dissenting
opinion), however, it is clear that a majority of the Court believed, at least in theory, that system-
atic discriminatory use of the peremptory would violate the equal protection clause.
56. See id. at 221-22.
57. But see United States v. Pearson, 448 F.2d 1207, 1217 (5th Cir. 1971) (interpreting Swain
not to mean "that the attack on the Government's use of its challenges must fail if the impermissi-
ble use is not exercised one hundred percent of the time").
58. 380 U.S. at 223.
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showing that blacks were on venires but not seated on juries would not
be sufficient; the defendant must also prove that the prosecutor alone
was responsible for the exclusion of blacks.59 Indeed, although at the
time of the case in 1965 not a single black had served on a jury in
Talladega County since 1950,60 the Court rejected defendant Swain's
claim of systematic prosecutorial exclusion of blacks. There were other
potential causes, the Court said, for the absence of blacks on juries,
such as the desires of some defense attorneys to keep blacks off juries. 6'
In addition, there was "no allegation or explanation, and hence no op-
portunity for the State to rebut, as to when, why and under what cir-
cumstances in cases previous to this one the prosecutor used his strikes
to remove Negroes."62 Accordingly, the majority held that defendant
Swain had failed to meet his burden of proof.63
The Swain burden of proving systematic, exclusionary use of the
peremptory by the prosecution is clearly a heavy one. The individual
defendant is not likely to have in his possession information concerning
the prosecutor's peremptory challenges in past cases.' Furthermore,
court officials do not commonly keep records of the racial identity of
jurors, or of prospective jurors peremptorily challenged by the prosecu-
tion.65 Not surprisingly, therefore, every defendant who has raised a
claim of the prosecutor's systematic, exclusionary use of the peremp-
tory has ultimately been unable to meet the burden of proof imposed
by Swain.66
59. Id. at 224-27.
60. Id. at 205.
61. Id. at 224-27.
62. Id. at 226.
63. Id. In a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas joined,
Justice Goldberg argued that by showing that no black had served on a jury for many years in a
county with a 26% black population, defendant Swain had made out a prima facie case of viola-
tion of the equal protection clause. Id. at 232 (dissenting opinion). Justice Goldberg saw no
reason for concluding, as the majority did, that the prima facie rule developed in cases involving
exclusions from jury lists and venires, see note 29 supra, should not be applied to cases of exclu-
sion from actual jury service. 380 U.S. at 239 (dissenting opinion). The dissenters, in other words,
objected to the extraordinarily heavy burden of proof imposed by the majority on defendants who
would seek to make out a case of systematic unconstitutional use of the peremptory. Not even the
dissenters, however, believed that the exercise of the peremptory in individual cases should be
subject to constitutional standards. Id. at 245; see Note, Fair Jury Selection Procedures, 75 YALE
L.J., 322, 325 (1965).
64. See People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 285-86, 583 P.2d at 767, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 909 (1978).
65. Id. at 286 & n.34, 583 P.2d at 768 & n.34, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 909 & n.34.
66. See J. VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 151; Annot., 79 A.L.R.3d 14, 22 (1977). The district
court in United States v. Robinson, 421 F. Supp. 467 (D. Conn. 1976), held that defendant therein
had established a prima facie case of systematic, impermissible use of the peremptory challenge by
the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Connecticut. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, however, vacated the district court's order. United States v. Newman, 549
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The California Supreme Court's decision in People v. Wheeler is a
reaction to prosecutorial abuse of the peremptory challenge. The ulti-
mate objective of the peremptory challenge system, of course, is the
selection of an impartial jury.6" Each party peremptorily challenges
those jurors whom he perceives as most strongly biased against him, in
the hope that the challenged juror will be replaced by another juror
who is either favorably disposed or neutral towards him.6" The theory
behind the system is that the parties will remove the "extremes" of par-
tiality on either side, leaving behind a jury that is more or less neutral
or impartial.69 The theory breaks down, however, where the group
composition of the community makes it impossible for one party to
"cancel out" the effect of the other party's peremptory challenges. If,
for example, the community is divided into a white majority and a
black minority, the party who regards whites as sympathetic to his side
may have enough peremptory challenges to exclude all blacks from the
jury.70 The party who would prefer a jury that includes blacks, how-
ever, may be unable to secure a single black juror because the number
of whites in the venire is greater than the number of available peremp-
tory challenges.7 It was just this situation that allowed the prosecutors
in Swain and Wheeler to ensure that the black defendant in each case
would be tried by an all-white jury and thus render the cross-section
requirement meaningless.
Responding to the reality of exclusionary use of the peremptory,
the court in Wheeler sought to give substance to the representative
cross-section requirement. Accomplishment of that goal, however, re-
quired the court to redefine the peremptory challenge. Indeed, the
court's definition of the peremptory's purpose and scope predetermined
the holding in Wheeler. Precisely because of the properly representa-
tive nature of the master list and the random method by which a venire
is drawn from that list, the venire may include "jurors who bring to the
courtroom a bias concerning the particular case on trial or the parties
or witnesses thereto-we may call this 'specific bias'--derived, for ex-
ample, from personal experience or from general exposure to pretrial
F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977). For discussions of Robinson and Newman, see Note, 8 CUM. L. REv. 307
(1977); Recent Development, 41 ALB. L. REv. 623 (1977).
67. See notes 92-96 and accompanying text infra.
68. See Kuhn, Jury Discriminatiorn The Next Phase, 41 S. CALIF. L. RrV. 235, 287 (1968).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See id.
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publicity. u72 It is these jurors, and these jurors alone, the court said,
whom challenges, both peremptory andfor cause, are designed to re-
move.73 The court acknowledged that the peremptory challenge serves
the additional functions traditionally ascribed to it-removal of a juror
whose bias cannot be sufficiently proved to form the basis of a chal-
lenge for cause, protection of the challenge for cause and the question-
ing that precedes it, and promotion of the appearance of impartiality.74
Nevertheless, explained the court, the scope of the peremptory, like
that of the challenge for cause, must be limited to the removal of jurors
who have a specific bias.75 To permit the removal of a juror solely
because of his presumed "group bias," the court reasoned, is to reduce
unnecessarily the representative nature of the jury.76 With one or more
of the community's groups thus underrepresented, the jury becomes
"dominated by the conscious or unconscious prejudices of the major-
ity,"77 and falls far short of achieving the overall impartiality that the
representative cross-section rule is designed to produce.
According to the Wheeler court, the peremptory challenge can and
must be required to conform to the representative cross-section rule
because the latter is a constitutional right, and the former merely a stat-
utory privilege guaranteed by neither the federal nor the California
constitution.78 In so concluding, the court echoed the many critics of
Swain v. Alabama who have pointed out that, in refusing to subject the
exercise of the peremptory in individual cases to the standards of the
equal protection clause, the Supreme Court mistakenly elevated a stat-
utory privilege above a constitutional right.79
Some authority exists, however, for the proposition that the per-
emptory challenge should be regarded as an element of the sixth
72. 22 Cal. 3d at 274, 583 P.2d at 760, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 901.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 275 n.16, 583 P.2d at 761 n.16, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 902 n.16; see notes 93-97 and
accompanying text infra.
75. 22 Cal. 3d at 276, 583 P.2d at 761, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 902.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 281 n.28, 583 P.2d at 765 n.28, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906 n.28.
79. See, e.g., Kuhn, supra note 68, at 287-88; Note, The Jury.A Reflection of the Prejudices of
the Communiy, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 1417, 1431 (1969). Justice Goldberg, dissenting in Swain,
pointed out that if the Court were forced to choose between the defendant's rights under the equal
protection clause and the exercise of the peremptory challenge, "the Constitution compels a choice
of the former." 380 U.S. at 244 (dissenting opinion). It was not necessary to make such a choice
in Swain, Justice Goldberg said, because defendant had made out a prima facie case of the prose-
cutor's long-continued, systematic use of the peremptory to exclude blacks from petit juries. Ac-
cordingly there was no need to consider his claim of unconstitutional use of the peremptory in his
own individual case. Id. at 232, 244-45 (dissenting opinion); see note 63 supra.
[Vol. 58
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
amendment right to jury trial. The Supreme Court in Pointer v. United
State 80 recognized the peremptory as "one of the most important
rights secured to the accused. ' 81 Also, the respect with which the
Swain majority treated the peremptory challenge in the face of consti-
tutional attack can be regarded as an implicit recognition of the per-
emptory's constitutional status.8 2 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has
not overruled its declaration in Stilson v. United States83 that the Con-
stitution does not guarantee the right to exercise peremptory chal-
lenges, 84 and even the majority in Swain acknowledged that the
peremptory, while important and well established, is not guaranteed by
the Constitution." Thus, the California Supreme Court was well
within established precedent when it declared that in a conflict between
the peremptory challenge and the constitutional right to a jury drawn
from a representative cross-section of the community, the latter must
prevail. On the other hand, while the Court in Swain recognized that a
prosecutor's long-continued, systematic use of the peremptory would
be a violation of the equal protection clause, it imposed on defendants
"an effectively insurmountable burden of proving such a violation."8 6
Similarly, the Taylor decision recognized the constitutional basis of the
representative cross-section rule, but limited its application to jury lists
and venires, thereby permitting parties to destroy the representative
character of the jury via the peremptory challenge.87 The novelty of
the Wheeler decision, therefore, lies in its providing the defendant with
a meaningful opportunity to prevent his opponent from exercising the
peremptory unconstitutionally, regardless of the prosecutor's practice
in prior trials.
Because it subjects peremptory challenges in individual cases to
judicial scrutiny, the Wheeler decision is clearly in conflict with Swain
v. Alabama. Rather than distinguishing Swain s8 however,the Califor-
80. 151 U.S. 396 (1894).
81. Id. at 408.
82. Babcock, supra note 11, at 556.
83. 250 U.S. 583 (1919).
84. Id. at 586.
85. 380 U.S. at 219. The California Constitution also has been held not to guarantee the
right to challenge peremptorily. People v. King, 240 Cal. App. 2d 389, 49 Cal. Rptr. 562 (1966).
86. See text accompanying notes 57-66 supra.
87. See text accompanying notes 42 & 43 supra.
88. The California court could have distinguished Swain because that case did not address
the same issue as that presented in Wheeler. Since the cross-section requirement had not yet been
recognized as an element of the sixth amendment right to jury trial, and since the latter had not
yet been held applicable to the states, Swain based his challenge on the equal protection clause.
380 U.S. at 203-04. When the Supreme Court finally declared in Taylor v. Louisiana that the sixth
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nia Supreme Court chose to rely on its interpretation of its own state
constitution. Accordingly, the court declared that the California Con-
stitution's guarantee of jury trial 9 incorporates the right to a jury
drawn from a representative cross-section of the community ° Because
the decision in Wheeler rested on the California Constitution and pro-
vided a greater degree of constitutional protection than the Supreme
Court's holding in Swain, the latter decision was not binding on the
California court.9
Although the decision in Wheeler will undoubtedly curb some of
the existing abuse of the peremptory challenge by prosecutors, it may
inhibit some of the peremptory's useful functions as well. It should be
noted that under the procedure adopted in Wheeler not only prosecu-
tors, but also defendants, are prohibited from peremptorily challenging
jurors solely on the basis of group association.92 Thus, what in some
cases has been a useful tool for the defendant may no longer be avail-
able to him.
The potential effect of the Wheeler decision on defendants' exer-
cise of the peremptory can best be analyzed by considering the ability
of the peremptory challenge to serve its historical purposes in accord-
ance with the new procedure. Theoretically, the peremptory challenge
promotes its ultimate objective of jury impartiality in several ways.
First, it protects the strength of the challenge for cause by allowing the
removal of a juror who has been offended by the questions asked by an
attorney in an unsuccessful challenge for cause.93  Presumably the
amendment included the cross-section requirement, it carefully limited the latter's application to
jury pools or lists and venires. 419 U.S. at 538. Recognizing Taylors implied approval of Swain,
and recalling Swain's strong commitment to the unrestricted exercise of the peremptory, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court assumed that were the United States Supreme Court presented with the
facts of *heeler, it would not find that the sixth amendment had been violated. 22 Cal. 3d at 284-
85, 583 P.2d at 767, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 908.
89. "Trial by jury is an inviolate right and shall be secured to all . CAL. CONsT. art. I,§ 16.
90. In finding the cross-section requirement to be an element of the California Constitution's
provision for jury trial, the court relied on People v. White, 43 Cal. 2d 740, 278 P.2d 9 (1954). In
White the California Supreme Court declared that "[tihe American system requires an impartial
jury drawn from a cross section of the entire community," id. at 754, 278 P.2d at 18, but did not
cite any particular provision of either the federal or the California Constitution as the source of
the requirement. The Wheeler court, therefore, made "explicit what was implicit in Whte," by
holding that the California Constitution guarantees the right to ajury drawn from a representative
cross-section of the community. 22 Cal. 3d at 272, 583 P.2d at 758, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 899-900.
91. 22 Cal. 3d at 785-87, 583 P.2d at 767-68, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 909-10.
92. Id. at 282 n.29, 583 P.2d at 765 n.29, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906 n.29. "[T]he People no less
than individual defendants are entitled to a trial by an impartial jury drawn from a representative
cross-section of the community." Id.
93. Id. at 275 n.16, 583 P.2d at 761 n.16, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 902 n.16; Babcock, supra note 11,
at 554-55.
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Wheeler court would consider any hostility produced in a juror by a
party's vigorous voir dire examination to be a "specific bias" for which
the peremptory challenge could be legitimately exercised because such
hostility would certainly be "a bias concerning the particular case on
trial or the parties or witnesses thereto."94
Second, the peremptory has traditionally allowed a party to re-
move a juror whom he suspects of having a bias against him, but whose
bias cannot be sufficiently well established to form the basis of a chal-
lenge for cause.95 The defendant accused of rape, for example, might
wish to challenge some or all of the women called to the box. If these
women have said on voir dire that they would be impartial the judge
would almost certainly refuse to grant a challenge for cause.96 Yet,
some of these jurors may in fact be strongly biased against the defend-
ant. The Wheeler decision, contrary to conventional practice, would
clearly prohibit the defendant from peremptorily challenging these fe-
male jurors solely on the basis of their sex, despite the statistical likeli-
hood that some of them are indeed biased against the defendant.
The procedure adopted by the Wheeler court also curtails the abil-
ity of the peremptory to perform its third function-promotion of the
appearance of impartiality. It has traditionally been argued that the
peremptory challenge serves this function by giving the civil litigant or
the criminal defendant the unrestricted opportunity to exclude some of
the prospective jurors whom he perceives as biased against him or
whom he simply does not like.9 7 By prohibiting him from exercising
the peremptory to remove jurors because of their group associations,
however, the Wheeler decision severely limits the defendant's primary
tool for influencing the composition of the jury.
94. 22 Cal. 3d at 274, 583 P.2d at 760, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 901.
95. See id. at 275, 583 P.2d at 761, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 902; J. VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 146;
Babcock, supra note 11, at 554.
96. Judges are reluctant to grant a challenge for cause for an alleged bias on the part of a
juror who declares that he or she can judge the case impartially. Babcock, supra note 11, at 550.
97. See 22 Cal. 3d at 275 n.16, 583 P.2d at 761 n.16, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 902 n.16; Babcock,
supra note 11, at 552. Professor Babcock has observed that the peremptory also serves as a mask
for what might be conceived of as insulting generalizations if the reasons for exercising peremp-
tories were openly expressed and recognized as grounds for a challenge for cause.
Common human experience, common sense, psychosociological studies, and public
opinion polls tell us that it is likely that certain classes of people statistically have predis-
positions that would make them inappropriate jurors for particular kinds of cases. But to
allow this knowledge to be expressed in the evaluative terms necessary for challenges for
cause would undercut our desire for a society in which people are judged as individuals
and in which each is held responsible and open to compromise. . . .Instead we have
evolved in the peremptory challenge a system that allows the covert expression of what
we dare not say but know is true more often than not.
Id. at 553-54 (footnotes omitted).
1979]
NORTH CAROLIN4 LAW REVIEW [
In exchange for elimination of the unrestricted exercise of the per-
emptory, however, California defendants have received an assurance
that most future juries will be more representative than those in the
past. From the defendant's point of view, of course, the new procedure
is more or less advantageous than the conventional system of peremp-
tory challenges depending on whether the defendant is one whom the
conventional system disfavored or favored. The Wheeler procedure is
clearly an improvement over the conventional system from the perspec-
tive of the defendant who is a member of, or thinks his side of the case
is favored by, a cognizable group that is sufficiently small to allow the
prosecution peremptorily to challenge all or most of the veniremen who
are members of that group. This situation is illustrated by the Wheeler
case itself, in which the defendant was black, the victim white, and the
number of peremptories available to the prosecution large enough to
allow him to exclude all the blacks in the venire. The conventional
system of peremptory challenges works to the defendant's advantage,
however, when the defendant is white, the victim black and the number
of blacks in the venire small enough to permit their complete or sub-
stantial exclusion by the defendant. Similarly, in communities where
women are significantly underrepresented on jury venires, the male de-
fendant accused of rape may have enough peremptory challenges to
ensure that women are even more underrepresented on his jury. To
these defendants, a system that grants them unrestricted exercise of the
peremptory is clearly more favorable than one that offers them a
greater likelihood of a representative jury. It must be remembered,
however, that a defendant only has the constitutional right to have his
case heard by a jury that is "fair and impartial" and not by one that is
likely to be biased in his favor.
As the first case to impose constitutional requirements on the exer-
cise of the peremptory challenge in individual cases, the Wheeler opin-
ion, not surprisingly, left unresolved a number of questions concerning
the implementation of its holding. A significant remaining issue is
what constitutes a "cognizable group." One of the elements of a prima
facie case of impermissible use of the peremptory, the court said, is a
showing that the allegedly offending party has excluded members of "a
cognizable group within the meaning of the representative cross-section
rule."98 Because the Wheeler court expressly declined to establish stan-
dards for determining what constitutes a cognizable group, 99 the ques-
98. 22 Cal. 3d at 280, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 705.
99. Id. at 250 n.26, 583 P.2d at 764 n.26, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905 n.26.
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tion is likely to be a source of confusion. Earlier cases, of course, have
recognized certain groups--defined, for example, by race, sex or na-
tional origin-that cannot constitutionally be systematically excluded
from jury lists, grand juries, or petit jury venires. 00 Most of these deci-
sions, however, have been confined to the particular facts presented by
each case.' 0' The California court's reservation of judgment on this
issue indicates that it too plans to engage in a case-by-case determina-
tion of what constitutes a cognizable group.10 2
Also left unanswered by the California court is the question
whether the Wheeler decision prohibits a party from using the peremp-
tory challenge for any reason related to the challenged juror's group
association, or whether the peremptory might permissibly be used to
remove a particular juror whose answers on voir dire, though not suffi-
ciently indicative of bias to warrant a challenge for cause, suggest that
he or she does indeed hold the bias associated with the group. Could
the accused in a rape case, for instance, peremptorily challenge a fe-
male juror who, though she asserts she will be impartial, reveals on voir
dire some evidence, other than simply her sex, of a bias against male
rape defendants? The question is important because of the reluctance
of judges to grant a challenge for cause for racial, sexual, or similar
prejudice if the challenged juror denies having such a prejudice. 3 The
juror, of course, may be strongly biased, but embarrassed to admit be-
ing so. Attorneys, therefore, sometimes use sophisticated questions to
learn about a juror's true prejudices in order to have some basis for
exercising peremptory challenges.' °4 If the Wheeler decision allows a
party to exercise the peremptory challenge against a juror who on voir
dire reveals some evidence of racial, sexual, or similar bias, the decision
may be less revolutionary than it otherwise appears.
The question of how severely the Wheeler decision limits the per-
emptory challenge turns on the court's definitions of "specific bias" and
"group bias." A specific bias is one "concerning the particular case on
trial or the parties or witnesses thereto."'0 5 A defendant might perceive
a specific bias in a juror, the court explained, because the juror was
100. See note 9 supra.
101. Note, Limiting the Peremptory Challenge: Representation of Groups on Petit Juries, 86
YALE L.J. 1715, 1735 (1977).
102. For an argument that Wheeler expands the class of cognizable groups, see Meyer, Dis-
criminatory Use of Peremptory Challenges: The Wheeler Decision, CALIFORNIA ATTORNEYS FOR
CRIMINAL JUsTICE, FORUM, March-April, 1979, at 11, 13.
103. See Babcock, supra note 11, at 550.
104. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 141.
105. 22 Cal. 3d at 274, 583 P.2d at 760, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 901.
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once the victim of a crime, or simply because he has glared at the de-
fendant in the courtroom. 'I A prosecutor might suspect a specific bias
because the juror has long hair or because he has a record of prior
arrests. 0 7 As the court pointed out, these are all biases that cut across
the lines of cognizable groups defined by race, sex, or similar character-
istics.' Use of the peremptory to eliminate such biases is both permis-
sible and necessary because it "promote[s] the impartiality of the jury
without destroying its representativeness."' 9 The particular female ju-
ror's bias against rape defendants, however, does not cut across group
lines. Indeed, this juror has manifested on voir dire only the bias that
the defense attorney might presume all women to have. Thus, one
could argue that Wheeler and the representative cross-section rule re-
quire that this juror not be removed via the peremptory challenge.
Despite some language in the opinion suggesting that a party may
not use the peremptory challenge to remove jurors who individually
manifest a bias associated with their group, the more reasonable inter-
pretation is that Wheeler forbids the exercise of the peremptory only
when it is based on a mere presumption of group bias. The court de-
fined "group bias" as a bias presumed to be held by certain jurors
"merely because they are members of an identifiable group distin-
guished on racial, religious, ethnic, or similar grounds." 110 The sin in
exercising a peremptory challenge because of group bias apparently lies
in the act of presuming the bias to exist."' This interpretation is sup-
ported by some of the court's language in People v. Johnson,"I2 a com-
panion case to Wheeler. In that case the prosecutor admitted his
intention to challenge peremptorily as many blacks as possible on the
ground of their race because he believed they would be offended by the
appearance of the word "nigger" in some of the prosecution witnesses'
statements.' '3 The California Supreme Court, relying on Wheeler,
condemned the prosecutor's conduct as "decision-making by racial
106. Id. at 275, 583 P.2d at 760-61, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 902.
107. Id. at 275, 583 P.2d at 760, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 902. Persons with long hair or those with
records of prior arrests also constitute groups, the representation of which the cross-section rule
would seem to encourage. By suggesting that jurors with such characteristics could be perempto-
rily challenged for specific bias, however, the Wheeler court indicated that persons with long hair
or records of arrest do not constitute cognizable groups.
108. Id. at 276, 583 P.2d at 761, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 902.
109. Id.
110. Id.
I11. See Meyer, supra note 102, at 11.
112. 22 Cal. 3d 296, 538 P.2d 774, 148 Cal. Rptr. 915 (1978).
113. Id. at 300, 583 P.2d at 776, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 917.
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stereotype, a technique that should be anathema in our courts." 14 The
proper procedure, the court said, would have been for the prosecutor to
determine through questions on voir dire which individual black jurors
would be offended by the witness's language and therefore biased
against the prosecution. 5 If the evil lies in presuming bias merely
from group association, it would seem that the defendant accused of
rape, for example, could use the peremptory challenge to remove a fe-
male juror whose answers on voir dire somehow manifest a bias against
male defendants.
Under Wheeler a party need not justify any of his peremptory
challenges, of course, unless his opponent has rebutted the presumption
that the party is exercising his peremptories in a constitutional man-
ner.116 Thus, in the hypothetical rape case under discussion, the de-
fendant would be required to explain his peremptory challenges only
after the prosecution had established a prima facie case of the defend-
ant's use of the peremptory to exclude women solely because of their
sex. Once a prima facie case has been established, however, the alleg-
edly offending party must demonstrate that his peremptory challenges
were not based on group association alone." 7 Only then would the
allegedly offending party attempt to show that a challenged juror had
revealed through his or her answers on voir dire some indication, other
than the juror's group membership, of a bias associated with the group.
Once the prosecution has established a prima facie case of the rape
defendant's illegal use of the peremptory, the defendant, even if he is
able to elicit on voir dire some indication that a particular female juror
is biased against defendants in rape cases, must still demonstrate to the
judge's satisfaction that the indicia of this particular juror's bias against
rape defendants are sufficiently strong to rise to the level of a specific
bias, rather than a group bias presumed merely on the basis of the ju-
ror's sex. While this showing "need not rise to the level of a challenge
for cause,""' it is in effect a second-level challenge for cause. To jus-
tify his peremptorily challenging this female juror, the defendant ac-
cused of rape need not elicit an admission of prejudice from the juror
(the practical standard for a challenge for cause), but he must "prove,"
through the juror's answers on voir dire, that this particular juror's bias
114. Id. at 299, 583 P.2d at 775, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 917.
115. Id.
116. 22 Cal. 3d at 278-81, 583 P.2d at 762-64, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 904-06.
117. Id. at 281-82, 583 P.2d at 764-65, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
118. Id. at 281-82, 583 P.2d at 765, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
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against rape defendants is indicated by something more than her mem-
bership in the class of women.
Another source of uncertainty created by Wheeler is the relation-
ship between the Wheeler procedure and the traditionally limited scope
of voir dire in the California courts. The California courts have held
that questions asked on voir dire must be those that might establish one
of the statutorily enumerated grounds for challenges for cause."t 9 With
voir dire so restricted, a party might not be able to engage in the sort of
questioning necessary to establish the specific bias that a juror may
have. Such a limited range of questions would certainly make it diffi-
cult for a party to elicit an indication of racial, sexual, or similar
prejudice from a juror who refuses to admit having such a bias.
Wheeler itself, however, may represent a liberalization of California's
traditionally limited voir dire. a0 Although the court did not expressly
reject the earlier cases restricting voir dire, the procedure established in
Wheeler calls for questions that go beyond those that could establish
statutory grounds for a challenge for cause.' 2 ' The party seeking to
rebut a prima facie case of impermissible use of the peremptory must
be able to ask more than whether the juror will be able, in view of his
racial, sexual, or similar background, to render an impartial verdict. In
order to establish a juror's specific bias the allegedly offending party
must be able to ask questions about the juror's attitudes and exper-
iences.122 Similar questions may also be helpful in establishing a prima
facie case. 123 Because of the importance of expanded voir dire under
the Wheeler procedure, the relationship between that procedure and
the earlier cases restricting voir dire will probably be the subject of
future litigation in the California courts.
Although it leaves unanswered a number of questions about the
scope of the limitations it places on the peremptory challenge, the deci-
sion in Wheeler will undoubtedly increase the representative character
of juries in most California criminal cases. Increased representative-
119. People v. Crowe, 8 Cal. 3d 815, 506 P.2d 193, 106 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1973); People v. Soltero,
81 Cal. App. 3d 423, 146 Cal. Rptr. 457 (1978).
120. Meyer, supra note 102, at 22-23.
121. See id. at 23.
122. Id.
123. If, for example, the prosecutor asks a black venireman about his attitudes toward the
police in hopes of establishing a specific bias on which to predicate his subsequent peremptory
challenging of that juror, defense counsel may wish to put similar questions to white veniremen to
determine whether any of those not challenged by the prosecutor actually have views toward the
police similar to that expressed by the challenged black juror. An affirmative answer would sug-
gest that the prosecutor was not exercising his peremptory challenges for reasons of specific bias.
Id.
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